Appellate Division, First Department - People v. Williams by Peterson, Brian E.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 25 




Appellate Division, First Department - People v. Williams 
Brian E. Peterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peterson, Brian E. (2012) "Appellate Division, First Department - People v. Williams," Touro Law Review: 
Vol. 25 : No. 4 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss4/7 
This Confrontation Clause is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Williams'
(decided May 22, 2008)
Michelle Williams was "convicted of two counts of offering a
false instrument for filing in the first degree."2 However, during voir
dire, the defendant was absent from sidebar discussions with respect
to three prospective jurors.3 Williams appealed to the Appellate Di-
vision, First Department, on the ground that "her right to be present at
all material stages of her trial was violated because of her absence
from conferences with prospective jurors S.D., M.C., and Y.T.' 4 She
argued that this absence amounted to a violation of her rights to be
present during material stages of the proceedings under the U.S. Con-
stitution, 5 the New York Constitution,6 and New York Criminal Pro-
cedure Law § 260.20. 7 The appellate division reversed Williams'
conviction, holding that her rights were violated because she did not
' 858 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008).
2 Id. at 149.
' Id. at 148-49.
4 Id. at 149.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, provides, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, provides, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person ... and shall be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or
her."
7 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 2008) provides, in pertinent part: "A de-
fendant must be personally present during the trial of an indictment."
1
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waive her right to be present,8 but rather asserted her right in open
court. 9
The defendant "was charged with filing a false New York
City Police Department complaint form and automobile theft affida-
vit alleging that her car had been stolen on February 10, 2005, when
in fact it had been destroyed in a fire four days earlier."' At trial, the
defendant's attorney informed the court that his client "believed one
of the prospective jurors[, S.D.,] had been a coworker."" That same
prospective juror acknowledged that eight years prior, she worked
with the defendant at a health center for two months. 12 However, the
information came to light at a sidebar conversation, during which the
defendant was not present.' 3 The transcript indicated that only S.D.,
the two assistant district attorneys, and the defendant's attorney were
present at the sidebar discussion. 14 It was further discovered that al-
though S.D. did not work in the same capacity as the defendant, they
did have daily contact during their concurrent employment at the
health center.' 5 Nonetheless, S.D.'s qualification as a juror was not
challenged and she became a jury member, despite the availability of
a peremptory challenge for the defense.' 6 Contrary to the voir dire of
8 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 150-5 1.
9 Id. at 151. Instead of remanding for a reconstruction hearing to determine "whether de-
fendant was 'essentially present at the sidebars,' "the court ordered a new trial. Id.
10 Id. at 148.
' ' Id. at 149.
12 Id.
13 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. S.D. was asked whether she had any feelings about the defendant, whether she
would lean in favor or against the defendant, and whether she ever saw Williams in situa-
tions which gave her negative impressions of him. Her response to each was in the negative.
1136 [Vol. 25
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S.D., the "defendant was [later] present for the voir dire of a different
prospective juror." 7
Likewise, Williams was absent from sidebar discussions re-
garding two other prospective jurors as well.18 One such individual,
M.C., pleaded that she "could not promise that she would keep her
own case separate and apart from [the] defendant's."' 9 The other,
Y.T., believed that she would be biased toward firefighters because
she lived next to a firehouse for many years.20 After pleading their
cases, both M.C. and Y.T. were "excused on consent" of the parties.
21
Following the defendant's conviction and sentence of five
years' probation and a $1,000 fine, she appealed to the Appellate Di-
vision, First Department, arguing that she had a right to be present
during the "conferences with prospective jurors S.D., M.C., and
Y.T. 22 The prosecution contested on the ground that Williams was
within hearing distance from the sidebar and that she "implicitly
waived her right to be present at sidebars with prospective jurors be-
cause she was absent from ten sidebar discussions. 23 The appellate
division disagreed, stating that her absence from the three sidebar
conferences violated Williams' "fundamental right to be present at all
material stages of trial. 24
Id.
17 Id.
18 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
19 Id.
20 Id. ("[S]he did not think she could keep her positive experiences with firefighters sepa-
rate and apart from defendant's case.").
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
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The court reasoned that the prosecution's argument regarding
the ability of the defendant to hear the discussion was purely specula-
tive.5 Further, the argument that defendant "implicitly waived her
right" to be included at sidebar discussions was unavailing for three
reasons.26 First, sidebar discussions that exclude the defendant are
permissible if the " 'questions relate to juror qualifications such as
physical impairments, family obligations, and work commitments.'
,27 Only four of the ten sidebar discussions cited by the prosecution
pertained to one of those issues.28 The court would not infer that the
defendant implicitly waived all ten just because she was absent for
those four.29 "Second, one of the ten sidebars mentioned by the Peo-
ple was with a sworn juror, not a prospective juror., 30 " 'Whether a
seated juror is grossly unqualified to serve is a legal determination' "
that does not require the defendant's presence. 31 "Third, a waiver of
the right to be present must be 'voluntary, knowing and intelligent.'
5,32 Furthermore, a "silent record" does not suggest an implicit
waiver.33
After discussing the flaws of the prosecution's contentions,
the court addressed the arguments against holding a reconstruction
21 Id. at 150.
26 Id.
27 Id. (quoting People v. Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1992)).
28 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
29 Id.
30 Id. (emphasis omitted).
31 Id. (quoting People v. Harris, 783 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 2002)).
32 Id. (quoting People v. Vargas, 668 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1996)). In People v. McAdams,
the defendant was absent from many sidebar discussions and the court deemed he had not
waived his right. McAdams, 802 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2005).
33 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
1138 [Vol. 25
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hearing.34 Since the court determined that Williams did not waive
her rights and that there was evidence in the transcript depicting who
was present at the sidebar discussions, the court decided against a re-
construction hearing.35 The court also stated that the "distance be-
tween the table and the bench is not determinative" because it does
not take certain factors into account.36 Thus, a reconstruction hearing
would not likely resolve the issue and, therefore, the court reversed
Williams' conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.37
In dissent, Justice Buckley voiced that he would have "re-
mand[ed] for a reconstruction hearing to determine whether the side-
bar with prospective juror S.D. was conducted in such a manner as to
permit defendant, seated only eight feet away, to see and hear the col-
loquy., 38 He continued, "we remanded [in People v. Davidson] for a
reconstruction hearing to determine 'the extent to which defendant
actually saw and heard sidebar voir dire.' ,39 In addition, Justice
Buckley reasoned that a reconstruction hearing would not be neces-
sary with respect to the prospective jurors, M.C. and Y.T., because
they were excused for cause.40
14 Id. at 150-51.
35 Id. (citing People v. Velasquez, 801 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 2003); People v. Lucious, 704
N.Y.S.2d 758 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2000); People v. Tor, 697 N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1998)).
36 Williams, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 151 ("[I]t does not take into consideration the loudness of the
sidebar conferences.., on the day they occurred or defendant's ability to hear the conversa-
tions.").
37 Id.
38 Id. (Buckley, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Brown, 638 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1995)).
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In Faretta v. California,41 the United States Supreme Court il-
lustrated the accused party's Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him.42  More broadly, Faretta discussed a defen-
dant's right to waive a Sixth Amendment protection.43 The defendant
was charged with grand theft, and after being assigned a public de-
fender, he demanded that he be permitted to represent himself.44 Al-
though the judge hesitated, he allowed Faretta to waive his right and
represent himself but reserved the right to reverse his decision.45
Weeks later, the judge held a hearing to test the defendant's abilities
and reversed his earlier decision and appointed a public defender to
Faretta's case.46 The jury convicted Faretta and the judge sentenced
the defendant to serve time in prison.47
On appeal, the Court discussed whether an individual has the
right to waive counsel in a state court.48 The Court found that the
Confrontation Clause gives a defendant the right to be present
throughout the trial process in order to preserve fundamental fairness
and that the defense may be made easier if the defendant is able to
participate. 49 Therefore, the Confrontation Clause allows a defendant
to be present and to take over for his attorney if he fails to do the job.
4' 422 U.S. 806 (1975). "It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 'confronted with the
witnesses against him'...." Id. at 819.
42 Id. at 819.
43 Id. at 807. The issue amounted to whether a court may force a defendant to be repre-
sented by counsel. Id.
" Id.
45 Id. at 807-08.
46 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808-10. The judge ruled that the defendant had "no constitutional
right to conduct his own defense." Id. at 810.
41 Id. at 811.
48 Id. at 807.
49 Id. at 816 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934)).
1140 [Vol. 25
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Accordingly, the Court vacated Faretta's conviction and remanded
the case.50 In so holding, the Court acknowledged not only that a de-
fendant may refuse court appointed counsel, but that a defendant may
insist on being present for the examination of jurors.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided an important
Confrontation Clause case in United States v. Hernandez.51 The de-
fendant, William Hernandez, was convicted of "conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute greater than 500 grams of cocaine. 52 The
defendant failed to appear in court for the first two days of his trial.53
On the second day, the judge decided to proceed "in absentia"; and
the jury was impaneled without Hernandez.54 Hemandez moved for a
mistrial during the trial, and then appealed his conviction on the
ground that he was not present during the jury selection.55
The Second Circuit fully recognized a criminal defendant's
fundamental right to be present at his own trial56 and remanded for an
"inquiry into the reasons for [the] appellant's absence during the im-
paneling of the jury., 57 Not only is the right guaranteed under the
Sixth Amendment but, in federal courts, the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure require a defendant's presence at "every trial stage, in-
cluding jury impanelment and the return of the verdict."5 8 However,
51 Id. at 836.
51 873 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1989).
52 Id. at 516.
51 Id. at517.
54 Id.
15 Id. at 517-18.
56 Hernandez, 873 F.2d at 518.
17 Id. at 520.
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the court qualified the right by stating that it is subject to waiver.5 9
Therefore, if, on remand, the court determined that the defendant
waived his right to be present during the impaneling of the jury, the
judgment would stand.6 °
Another Second Circuit case relating to the accused's right to
be present during jury impanelment is Tankleff v. Senkowski.6 1 The
defendant was accused of killing his mother and father.62 In this
highly publicized case, "approximately 500 potential jurors were
questioned in open court" about whether media reports molded their
opinion of the case and whether they were available for what ap-
peared to be a long trial.63 While the defendant was present for the
first stage of juror questioning, he did not attend the questioning of
the 150 prospective jurors siphoned from the original 500.64 Those
prospective jurors were questioned individually in the trial judge's
chambers.6 5 Although Tankleff's attorney was present in chambers
to question the jurors, he did not object to the absence of his client. 6
After the group of 150 potential jurors was filtered, the defendant at-
tended the voir dire of those remaining, which took place in open
court with jurors in the jury box.67 Such jurors presumably stated that
the media coverage would not influence their take on the case.68
59 Hernandez, 873 F.2d at 518.
60 Id.
61 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998).
62 Id. at 240-41.
63 Id. at 246.
64 Id. at 246-47.
65 Id. at 246.
66 Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 246-47.
67 Id. at 247.
68 Id. at 246-47.
1142 [Vol. 25
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After his conviction, Tankleff unsuccessfully appealed to the
appellate division and New York Court of Appeals.69 He claimed
that his "constitutional right to attend all material portions of his trial
was violated by the procedure employed by the trial court in screen-
ing potential jurors., 70 The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of New York denied Tankleff's petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus but later granted a certificate of appealability.
71
Accordingly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether
the defendant "waived his right to be present during [that] particular
stage of voir dire., 72 The court concluded that it was likely Tankleff
and his attorneys did not believe his presence at the in camera ses-
sions was necessary, 73 and therefore "waiver may properly be in-
ferred from [their] conduct. 74 Thus, although the defendant was not
present for a large portion of voir dire, his constitutional right under
the Confrontation Clause was not violated.75
The Second Circuit discussed the extent to which a defen-
dant's exclusion from sidebar discussions during jury selection vio-
lated his rights in United States v. Feliciano.76 Feliciano and two co-
defendants were convicted of murdering and conspiring to murder a
69 Id. at 247.
70 Id. at 246.
71 Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 239.
72 Id. at 247.
73 Id. ("The far more likely explanation for [Tankleff's] absence is that he and his lawyers
did not think it was important for him to be present at this tedious, routine screening de-
signed to eliminate jurors who had been prejudiced by pretrial publicity.").
74 Id. (citing Hernandez, 873 F.2d at 518 (stating that" '[a] defendant can waive that right
expressly, or can do so effectively by failing to appear at trial.' ")); United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985) (stating that an express waiver on the trial record is not neces-
sary)).
75 Id.
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sixteen-year-old member of their gang.77 The defendants were pre-
sent during voir dire when Feliciano's attorney requested that the
court allow any prospective juror to discuss sensitive issues at side-
bar.78 However, the court refused to allow Feliciano to be present at
the bench for security reasons. 79 Instead, the court stipulated that Fe-
liciano's attorney could consult with his client at any point during the
proceeding, if desired. 80 Additionally, the prospective jurors were
asked if they knew of the defendants' gang and each was given the
opportunity to discuss the extent of his or her knowledge at sidebar.
81
Two prospective jurors took advantage of this opportunity and even-
tually became jurors. 82 The court asserted that-at all times-the de-
fendants were within fifteen feet from the bench and "expressed [no]
dissatisfaction with the composition of the jury selected for service,"
nor did defense counsel interrupt the process to consult with Fe-
liciano. 83
The defendants appealed their convictions on the ground that
"the district court erred ... by conducting portions of voir dire out-
side their hearing. 84 Feliciano argued that "conducting this ques-
tioning... outside the hearing of the defendants violated his constitu-
tional rights under the . . . Sixth Amendment[] and his right to be
77 Id. at 107.
78 Id. at 108 ("[T]he court permitted some of the venire persons to come to the bench to
discuss questions they might feel uncomfortable discussing in open court, relating to such
matters as personal or family members' involvement with crime or drugs.").
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 108.
82 Id. Another venire person approached the bench to discuss a medical appointment. Id.
at 108-09.
83 Id. at 109.
'4 Id. at 107, 110.
1144 [Vol. 25
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present under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. 85
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed
whether the fairness or validity of the trial was compromised by de-
nying the defendants' right to be present at the bench discussions.86
The court affirmed, concluding that it was "clear that any error...
did not 'affect[] the framework within which the trial proceed[ed].'
,87 The court reasoned that the defense attorneys had ample opportu-
nity to consult with their clients and that the three defendants were all
present throughout the jury selection process. 88 Further, the defen-
dants' counsel fully participated in questioning at the bench and did
not oppose any of the jurors selected. 89 Therefore, the court decided
that the lack of defendants' presence at the sidebar conversations was
harmless. 90
The ramifications of waiver of the right to be present at side-
bar discussions during jury selection were discussed in Sanchez v.
Duncan.9' The defendant, Victor Sanchez, was charged in New York
State County Court with sexual abuse, harassment in violation of an
order of protection, threatening to kill another person, and conspiring
to obtain a gun to kill numerous individuals, including a police offi-
cer.92 Before voir dire, the defendant informed the court that he
85 Id. at 110. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(2).
86 Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 111.




91 282 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2002).
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would not waive his Antommarchi right to be present at "sidebar voir
dire conferences. 93 The trial judge advised the defendant that this
would inconvenience the jury.94 The next day, the trial judge empha-
sized again that the defendant's decision to assert his right to be pre-
sent would put a strain on the proceedings.95 The court then asked
that the courtroom be prepared for prospective jurors, at which time
the defendant changed his mind and signed the waiver. 96 Sanchez as-
serted that he understood his rights, that no one pressured him, and
that he knowingly waived his rights.97 Throughout the voir dire, nine
prospective jurors requested a sidebar, but none of them served on the
jury.98 Ultimately, the jury convicted Sanchez and he was later sen-
tenced to forty-one to eighty-two years in prison.99
Sanchez appealed on the grounds that "his federal and state
law rights to be present during sidebar voir dire conferences were
violated."100 The Appellate Division, Second Department, modified
the length of the sentence and affirmed the conviction, and the New
York Court of Appeals denied defendant's leave to appeal. 10 1 San-
chez then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York making the same argument regarding the "right to
be present during sidebar" discussions with prospective jurors, but
93 Id.
94 Id. ("[Tihe jury is going to be sent in and out and jerked around, and they may resent
that.").
9' Id. at 79-80.





l0 Sanchez, 282 F.3d at 80.
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the petition was denied.
1 2
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the ha-
beas denial, acknowledging that a "criminal defendant has a federal
constitutional right, under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment . . . 'to be present at all stages of the trial where his ab-
sence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings[, and] impanel-
ing of the jury is one such stage.' ,,'03 The government argued that in
New York a criminal defendant's right to be present at sidebars is es-
tablished in state procedure law-not federal law-so the defendant
cannot argue for habeas corpus relief because the right was waived.
10 4
The court agreed, noting that the error was harmless because:
(1) Sanchez was present in the courtroom for the en-
tire jury selection process; (2) there were nine bench
conferences during the entire voir dire; (3) Sanchez
does not adequately refute appellee's assertions that
defense counsel participated in the nine bench confer-
ences and that Sanchez had ample opportunity to con-
sult with his attorney about the conferences; and (4) of
the nine prospective jurors who attended bench con-
ferences, none actually served on the jury.1
0 5
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court judgment as there
was no structural error and any other error was harmless. 1
06
In terms of New York state law, People v. Antommarchi set
major precedent. 0 7 In Antommarchi, the defendant was convicted of
02 Id. at 80.
103 Id. at 81 (quoting Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 246).
104 Id. at 81-82. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(2).
105 Sanchez, 282 F.3d at 82.
106 Id. at 82-83.
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criminal drug possession in the third degree and the appellate division
affirmed.10 8 The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Ap-
peals based on his absence from the bench sidebar discussions,
wherein several prospective jurors spoke of matters they wished to
remain private. 1 ' Specifically, the court addressed whether the pro-
spective jurors could objectively decide a case after experiences with
victims or individuals who had been arrested, whether a drug sale
charge made the defendant appear guilty, and whether friendships
with police officers would cloud their judgment in hearing testimony
from officers on the witness stand." 0
The court recognized that a criminal defendant has a "funda-
mental right to be present during any material stage of the trial and
questioning during the impaneling of the jury may constitute a mate-
rial stage of the trial.""' However, the defendant need not be present
for voir dire questioning regarding physical impairments, responsi-
bilities to an employer, and family duties." 2 The defendant's right to
be present may be asserted for the exploration of a prospective juror's
background and objectivity with respect to the evidence." 3 The right
gives a defendant the ability to observe " 'subliminal responses' "
from a juror."l 4 Accordingly, the court held that the trial court "vio-
lated [the] defendant's right to be present during a material part of the
1' Id. at 96.
'09 Id. at 96-97 ("The discussions were held on the record and in the presence of counsel,
but without defendant.").
110 Id. at 97.
Id. (citations omitted).
112 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
113 Id.
S4 Id. (quoting People v. Sloan, 592 N.E.2d 784, 787 (N.Y. 1992).
1148 [Vol. 25
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People v. Roman'16 reaffirmed a criminal defendant's funda-
mental right to be present at all material stages of a New York state
trial. 117 In Roman, during voir dire, a sidebar discussion was held
without the defendant present but later the individual was not seated
as a juror. 18 The New York Court of Appeals stated that the "right to
be present at a sidebar conference with a prospective juror exploring
possible general or specific bias is governed exclusively by New
York statutory law."119 However, a court may reject the assertion of
such a right when the impact on the outcome is merely speculative or
the violation of the statute has minimal effect.120 The Court of Ap-
peals held that the defendant was not prejudiced by his exclusion
from the sidebar because the prospective juror was not seated on the
jury and since the trial court disqualified the juror, the defendant
could not have added any meaningful input.121 "When a prospective
juror is disqualified by the court for cause, any benefit defendant
could possibly claim from his presence at that excuse for cause hear-
ing would have been 'but a shadow' ... and purely speculative.'
122
The Williams Court cited to People v. Maher'2 3 for its analy-
115 Id. Furthermore, the court stated that although he failed to object to the discussions, he
was not precluded from making his claim. Id.
116 665 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 1996).
... Id. at 1054.
"' Id. at 1053.
'19 Id. at 1054.
120 Id. (citing People v. Morales, 606 N.E.2d 953 (N.Y. 1992)).
121 Roman, 665 N.E.2d at 1055 ("Disqualification of [venire woman] was a decision for
the trial court to make after hearing argument, if any, by counsel, at which defendant could
not have made any meaningful contribution.").
122 Id. (citations omitted).
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sis of what is considered material regarding the jury selection. In
Maher, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate divi-
sion's reversal of Maher's conviction because the defendant was ex-
cluded from a material stage of his trial. 124 Although the prosecution
argued that the record did not show by what mechanism certain jurors
were excused, the court held that the record supported the conclusion
that Maher was "erroneously excluded from a material stage" of his
trial; namely jury selection. 1
25
In People v. Davidson,126 the court once again held that a de-
fendant was deprived of his right to be present during voir dire ques-
tioning of prospective jurors. 127  Originally, the appellate division
remanded for a reconstruction hearing because segments of the voir
dire were not recorded. 128 The hearing uncovered that three prospec-
tive jurors conferred with the court regarding their ability to be im-
partial, outside the presence of the defendant. 29 Since each prospec-
tive juror was dismissed at the discretion of defense counsel, the
defendant could have influenced his attorney to do the same or ab-
stain. 130 "[T]he record 'do[es] not negate the possibility that [the] de-
fendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the [proceed-
ing].' ,,131 The court rejected the prosecution's speculative argument
that credence be given to whether the "dismissed juror appeared fa-
124 Maher, 675 N.E.2d at 835.
25 Id. at 836.
126 675 N.E.2d 1206 (N.Y. 1996).
127 Id. at 1207.
128 Id.
129 Id. ("Two of these prospective jurors were challenged peremptorily by the defense, and
one was excused by the parties on consent.").
130 Id.
'1 Davidson, 675 N.E.2d at 1207 (quoting Roman, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 10).
[Vol. 251150
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vorable or unfavorable for the defense.' 32 The appellate division's
order reversing the conviction was affirmed.'33
In People v. Vargas,134 the trial court applied certain condi-
tions to the prospective juror sidebar discussions. 135 The judge was
concerned with a juror's "uneasiness" that often manifested itself
when a defendant was allowed to take part in the sidebar discus-
sions. 136 If the defendant refused to waive his right to be present, the
judge would insist, as a condition, that the discussion take place in
public instead. 3 7 The defense objected on the ground that it would
prejudice other jurors or make the individual discussing private con-
cerns uncomfortable. 138  However, the defendant preemptively
waived his right on the record in order to prevent tainting of the other
jurors hearing a public testimonial. 39 As a result, the defendant was
absent for several sidebar discussions, although his lawyer partici-
pated.' 40 The jury found the defendant guilty of robbery in the first
degree.'
4 1
Both the appellate division and the Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 142 The Court of Appeals held that the right to be present at
sidebars is not a constitutional right; the right stems from New York
132 Id. at 1208.
133 Id.
134 Vargas, 668 N.E.2d 879.




131 Vargas, 668 N.E.2d at 882.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 888.
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Criminal Procedure Law § 260.20.143 Accordingly, for the defendant
to assert that his right was violated, he would need to possess that
right in the first place. "The unassailable fact, however, is that nei-
ther the State nor Federal Constitution, nor any statute, nor any deci-
sion of this Court or the Supreme Court grants such a set of preroga-
tives for [the] defendant[]." 144 The right the court referred to is that
of a criminal defendant "to have jurors discuss issues of bias and
prejudice at sidebar instead of in open court."' 145 Moreover, a waiver
must be by a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice. 146 Although
the defendant attempted to assert that his waiver was not voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent because of the conditions set by the trial
judge, the contention failed because neither the U.S. Constitution nor
the New York Constitution afforded that right. 
147
Further, in People v. Harris,148 a seated juror remained on the
jury after an "in camera hearing outside of [the] defendant[']s[] pres-
ence" because she was concerned about her own safety. 149 In Harris,
the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the in cam-
era hearing concerning a juror's fitness to take place outside of his
presence.150 The Court of Appeals held that "the presence of both de-
143 Id. at 884. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20.
144 Vargas, 668 N.E.2d at 884-85.
141 Id. at 884.
146 Id.
147 Id. Further, the appellate court acknowledged the need for discretion of the trial court,
including, perhaps, the ability to hold such proceedings in open court. Id. at 885. "[T]he
reasonably based experience of trial courts reveals that jurors are less likely to be truthful
about biases at sidebars if they are forced to speak of them in close proximity to the defen-
dant." Id.
141 Harris, 783 N.E.2d 502.
149 Id. at 505.
"0 Id. at 508.
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fense counsel at the hearing was sufficient to ensure that the defen-
dant[] received a 'fair and just hearing' " because such an in camera
hearing on a prospective juror's fitness to serve is an ancillary pro-
ceeding. 5 ' Thus, a legal determination by counsel is required and
sufficient in order to disqualify a juror.
152
In People v. Velasquez, 53 the Court of Appeals discussed the
effectiveness of a somewhat vague waiver. The defendant's attorney
waived his client's Antommarchi right on the record. 54 Although it
may not have been perfectly clear what defense counsel was waiving
when he stated " '[w]aived' " to the court, the judge responded im-
mediately by saying " 'Antommarchi waived.' ,,55 The Court of
Appeals held that a reconstruction hearing was not necessary since
"nothing in the record call[ed] into question the effectiveness of [the]
defendant's waiver as announced by counsel."'
' 56
In regard to silence during the sidebars, the Williams Court re-
lied on People v. Lucious.157 In Lucious, the defendant was convicted
of attempted assault, possessing a weapon, and robbery. 5 8 He argued
that he was absent from sidebar discussions and thus could not confer
with counsel regarding prospective jurors. 59 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, remitted the matter to the state supreme court for
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Velasquez, 801 N.E.2d 376.
114 Id. at 379 ("[It is plain from the record that defense counsel informed the court at the
bench that his client waived his right to be present at sidebar ... .
155 Id.
156 Id. at 380.
157 Lucious, 704 N.Y.S.2d 758.
158 Id. at 759.
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a reconstruction hearing because the record failed to identify whether
the defendant was present and how prospective jurors were ex-
cused. 60 Furthermore, "a waiver by defendant will not be inferred
from a silent record."
' 16'
There does not appear to be a bright line rule regarding a
criminal defendant's right under the Confrontation Clause with re-
spect to being present at sidebars during jury selection. Likewise, the
distinction between the Confrontation Clause under the U.S. Consti-
tution and the New York Constitution is minimal. The right to be
present at prospective juror sidebar conferences is broadly interpreted
by the courts based upon a defendant's right to confront a witness
against him or her. While many cases were remanded for a new trial
when the defendant was missing from a bench conference, absent
waiver, some courts have found a violation of this right to be harm-
less under certain circumstances. For example, if no prospective ju-
rors serve as jurors in the trial, the error may be harmless. However,
the fact that the defendant did not have the opportunity to observe a
potential juror's reactions and mannerisms may be reason enough to
reverse, notwithstanding the dismissal of the juror before trial. Fur-
thermore, the excusal of a prospective juror for cause has been held
as either a critical point or inconsequential. A defendant likely has a
more convincing argument on appeal if the individual actually served
on the jury after conferring with the court at a sidebar to the exclu-
sion of the defendant.
160 Id. at 761.




Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss4/7
CONFRONTATION CLA USE
Some courts remand for a reconstruction hearing and reserve
determination for the findings. However, under what circumstances
is it appropriate to remand for a new trial rather than reconstruction?
Precedent suggests that when the record is silent regarding who was
at the sidebar or how a juror was excused, a reconstruction hearing is
considered, if deemed necessary. Also, if the defendant sat within a
certain distance from the sidebar, there may be a constructive pres-
ence to be judged at a reconstruction hearing. Unfortunately, these
factors are not necessarily determinative.
Likewise, whether a defendant explicitly waives the Antom-
marchi right as compared to merely remaining silent should substan-
tially affect an appellate court's ruling. Speaking conservatively, a
defendant should not be allowed to sit idle while a prospective juror
engages in discussion at sidebar and then appeal an unfavorable deci-
sion. The prosecution will likely argue that silence constitutes
waiver. Should the courts demand an objection in order to preserve
the right to appeal on these grounds? Doing so may help create a
more efficient judicial system. If not, then the issue should be dis-
cussed and resolved by the legislature.
Finally, there has been debate regarding whether the Antom-
marchi court misinterpreted § 260.20 of New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law. 162 In fact, some New York state cases reject that the right
162 See, e.g., Christina Boulougouris, Comment, People v. Antommarchi: Do Antom-
marchi Rights Benefit Anyone? A Comprehensive Examination of the Decision and its Rami-
fications, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 991 (1993) (questioning the judicial extension of a criminal
defendant's right to be present at trial).
[lit is submitted that a criminal defendant should only have the right to
attend sidebar conferences during jury impaneling when a balancing of
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to be present at sidebars during jury selection exists from anything
but state law. Where do the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses
of the U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution fit in then?
It appears that the state courts prefer bypassing the constitutions in
favor of state statutes. Conversely, the federal courts recognized An-
tommarchi as precedent for sidebar discussions. In either case, a trial
court appears to have substantial discretion in making the decision, as
does the appellate court in reviewing that decision.
Brian E. Peterson
. a defendant should have the right to appeal only when his or her request
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